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Abstract
When people change beliefs as a result of reading a text, are they aware of these changes? This question was examined
for beliefs about spanking as an effective means of discipline. In two experiments, subjects reported beliefs about spanking
effectiveness during a prescreening session. In a subsequent experimental session, subjects read a one-sided text that
advocated a belief consistent or inconsistent position on the topic. After reading, subjects reported their current beliefs
and attempted to recollect their initial beliefs. Subjects reading a belief inconsistent text were more likely to change their
beliefs than those who read a belief consistent text. Recollections of initial beliefs tended to be biased in the direction
of subjects’ current beliefs. In addition, the relationship between the belief consistency of the text read and accuracy of
belief recollections was mediated by belief change. This belief memory bias was independent of on-line text processing
and comprehension measures, and indicates poor metacognitive awareness of belief change.
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When reading about scientific topics, people often read
texts that present evidence and arguments that are inconsistent with their previously held beliefs. For example, a
student may read in an introductory psychology textbook
that developmental twin studies indicate that homosexuality is partly determined by environmental influences
(Lillienfeld, Lynn, Namy, & Woolf, 2014). If this student
had believed that homosexuality was genetically determined, she may change her belief as a result of reading this
information. Indeed, evidence suggests that belief change
sometimes occurs as a consequence of reading scientific
texts (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Kardash & Scholes, 1995;
Murphy, Long, Holleran, & Esterly, 2003; Murphy &
Mason, 2006; Taylor & Kowalski, 2004). The primary
goal of this research was to examine whether people demonstrate metacognitive awareness of belief change. This
awareness was measured by examining the discrepancy
between a person’s current belief, their previously reported
belief and their recollection of that initial belief. Awareness
of belief change is an under studied issue, but may be an
important factor in people’s metacognitive understanding
of their own comprehension. If people show little awareness of changes in their own beliefs, they may erroneously
conclude that their beliefs are more fixed than they actually are, and consequently may be less willing to engage
with information that is contrary to their beliefs.

In this research, beliefs are defined as a statement about
the truth value of a proposition (Griffin & Ohlsson, 2001;
Wolfe & Griffin, in press). Beliefs are distinguished from
attitudes, which contain an affective component that
describes how a person feels or whether they wish something to be true or not (Ajzen, 2001). For example, the student who believes homosexuality is genetically determined
may or may not wish for that to be the case. Beliefs are
also distinguished from knowledge in that we store propositional or perceptual representations about many things
(Alexander, Schallert, & Hare, 1991), some of which we
do not believe to be real (such as fictional characters). We
also can understand claims, such as that vaccines cause
autism, without believing them to be true. In the literature
on conceptual change, misconceptions are beliefs under
this definition (Sinatra & Broughton, 2011). For example,
a belief that the earth is flat is a statement of truth value,
regardless of the person’s attitude or whether that statement corresponds with scientific evidence. Some scientific
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topics, such as evolution, show varied beliefs among
people despite broad scientific consensus (Sinatra,
Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003). Other scientific topics have varied beliefs and considerably less scientific consensus, such as effects of media violence on
actual violence (Boxer, Groves, & Docherty, 2015;
Ferguson, 2015). The current research addresses beliefs
about contentious topics for which beliefs vary and that
can be studied scientifically.

Belief change and awareness of belief
change
Research on belief change after reading argumentative
texts suggests that change is inconsistent and not fully
understood. People do sometimes change beliefs after
reading belief inconsistent texts (Kardash & Scholes,
1995; Murphy et al., 2003; Slusher & Anderson, 1996). In
experiments where this has occurred, subjects report
beliefs before and after they read a one-sided text that presents evidence and arguments relating to the topic. Other
studies show no evidence of belief change (Nyhan, Reifler,
Richey, & Freed, 2014; Prasad et al., 2009) and suggest
that people engage in a variety of strategies to maintain
their current beliefs (Chinn & Brewer, 1998; Lombardi,
Nussbaum, & Sinatra, 2016). Thus, in order to assess
metacognitive awareness of belief change, we needed to
create an experimental situation in which at least some
subjects would change beliefs in response to reading a
text. To accomplish this, we identified factors in previous
research that were associated with belief change. Low
knowledge readers may be more likely than high knowledge readers to change beliefs (Nyhan, Reifler, & Ubel,
2013). Texts with causal explanations of phenomena lead
to greater belief change than texts without causal explanations (Slusher & Anderson, 1996). Furthermore, Dole and
Sinatra (1998) propose that belief change is more likely
when readers are relatively uncommitted in terms of the
strength of their belief. In the current research, subjects
read about spanking effectiveness. This topic was chosen
because the subject population (undergraduates) is typically unfamiliar with the research on spanking effectiveness, their beliefs on this topic are varied, and research
based texts could be created for both sides of the issue.
Moreover, we reasoned that the vast majority of the subjects that were tested did not have children of their own
and therefore would hold relatively uncommitted views on
the topic.
Experiments on belief change in science or social science domains do not address whether people are aware of
their own belief change. One potential method for establishing awareness of belief change is to ask people if their
beliefs changed after reading. This method has been used
in some attitude change experiments (Corner, Whitmarsh,
& Xenias, 2012; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Miller,
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McHoskey, Bane, & Down, 1993; Munro & Ditto, 1997).
However, a perceived change in attitude can only be accurately assessed if the subjects have an accurate recollection
of their previous attitude. In fact, Corner et al. (2012),
Miller et al. (1993) and Munro and Ditto (1997) found
inconsistent results when comparing pre and post attitude
measures with perceived attitude change. A more valid
method to assess awareness of belief change is for subjects
to recollect their initial beliefs after they have read a text
and reported their post-reading beliefs. The difference (or
similarity) between initial beliefs and recollection of initial
beliefs thus constitutes a measure of their metacognitive
awareness of change.
Although metacognitive awareness of belief change has
not been examined, there is extensive research in the area
of comprehension monitoring (e.g., Maki, Shields,
Wheeler, & Zacchilli, 2005; Wiley, Griffin, & Thiede,
2005). This research suggests that people often have a relatively poor awareness of the extent to which they understand expository texts (Maki et al., 2005; Thiede, Griffin,
Wiley, & Anderson, 2010), as evidenced by generally low
correlations between comprehension judgments and test
performance. This literature also suggests that people do
not have direct access to the quality of their memory representations (Dunlosky & Thiede, 2013). Instead, two
types of mechanisms have been proposed that may underlie metacognitive judgments of comprehension. First, people may use available cues in memory such as retrieval
fluency to make judgments of comprehension success.
Benjamin, Bjork and Schwartz (1998) had subjects answer
trivia questions, then rate the probability they could recall
the answers on a later free recall test. Results showed that
the faster subjects answered the trivia questions, the greater
they rated their probability of correctly recalling the
answer. Their actual recollection performance showed the
opposite pattern; the answers that were later recalled the
best were the ones that subjects recalled most slowly.
These results suggest that retrieval fluency influenced
judgments of memory, but those judgments were inaccurate when compared to actual memory performance. A second possible explanation that may account for this
inaccuracy is that judgments are based on beliefs about
cognitive processing (Mueller, Dunlosky, & Tauber, 2016).
If people believe that a certain factor (such as familiarity
of content or similarity between items) is related to comprehension success, then comprehension judgments will
vary based on these beliefs.

Metacognitive awareness of attitude
change
A number of researchers in social psychology have examined people’s awareness of attitude change about certain
topics. These studies show evidence of a recollection bias
such that following attitude change, recollection of
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previously held attitudes are biased toward the direction of
current attitudes (Bem & McConnell, 1970; Goethals &
Reckman, 1973; Levine, 1997; Levine, Lench, & Safer,
2009; Levine & Safer, 2002; Markus, 1986; McFarland &
Ross, 1987; Ross, 1989). In a classic study involving attitude change, Goethals and Reckman (1973) examined
high school students’ attitudes toward bussing to achieve
racial integration. Students first reported their attitudes;
some thought bussing should take place, whereas others
thought the opposite. Students then participated in small
group discussions with others who held the same attitude.
In each group, one confederate argued strongly for the
opposite of the group position. After the discussion, students tended to shift attitudes in the direction of the confederate’s argument position. The authors of the study
found that recollections of students’ initial attitudes were
more similar to their current attitudes than to their actual
initial attitudes. Other examples of similarly biased recollection errors include dating satisfaction (McFarland &
Ross, 1987) and political opinions (Markus, 1986). Taken
together, these recollection errors about previous attitudes
suggest poor metacognitive awareness of these changes.
Ross (1989) proposed a theory of recollection bias in
which people hold implicit theories about the extent to
which aspects of our selves change over time. First, current attitudes about the topic in question are considered.
Second, an implicit theory about stability or change is
applied to determine whether it is likely that previous attitudes were similar to the current one. According to the
theory, recollections of previous attitudes are reconstructed
based on the assumption that the previous attitude is likely
to be similar or different to the current one. For example,
Ross (1989) interpreted the Goethals and Reckman (1973)
data by proposing that the students adopted a theory of stability. By assuming their attitudes were stable, the change
in attitudes led to large recollection errors about their previous attitudes. Ross’ (1989) theory relates to the metacognition literature in that he proposes beliefs rather than
retrieval fluency as the critical component to people’s
reconstruction of their previous attitudes.

Research goals
Based on the literatures in comprehension monitoring and
attitude change, we predict that when people change
beliefs as a result of reading, they will display biased recollection of their initial beliefs. We propose that people
form a mental representation of text information along
with associated knowledge, inferences and any interpretations of text content (Kintsch, 1998). We contend that current beliefs are reported based on salient information at the
time they are generated. Moreover, recollection of previous beliefs will also be generated based on currently available information, along with any beliefs or assumptions
about whether belief change has occurred. Thus, we

propose that belief change is typically inaccessible and not
subject to metacognitive awareness. We hypothesize that
following belief change, people will demonstrate poor recollection of their initial beliefs. We further hypothesize
that the magnitude of people’s recollection errors will be
mediated by their level of belief change.
In order to more fully understand metacognitive awareness of belief change, relationships are examined between
recollection accuracy of initial beliefs, and processing and
mental representation of the text information. Processing
refers to the mental activities that readers engage in as they
read, whereas the mental representation refers to the memory that readers form as a result of reading (Graesser,
Millis, & Zwaan, 1997). To date, no experiments have
examined the relationship between these factors and metacognitive awareness of belief or attitude change. Studies in
the comprehension monitoring literature suggest that people who perform better on exams make more accurate
exam predictions (Bol, Hacker, O’Shea, & Allen, 2005;
Nietfeld, Cao, & Osborne, 2005). However, Maki et al.
(2005) found no relationship between verbal ability and
metacomprehension accuracy. In an attempt to shed further light on this mixed evidence, we included several
measures that assessed subjects’ processing and memory
of the text content.

Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, subjects read either a belief consistent or
belief inconsistent text describing the scientific literature
related to spanking effectiveness. Beliefs were collected in
a prescreening questionnaire prior to the experimental session. Post-reading beliefs and belief recollections were
collected at the end of the experimental session. Argumentfocused processing was assessed with sentence-by-sentence reading times (Wolfe, Tanner, & Taylor, 2013) in
order to determine the extent to which subjects sped up or
slowed down reading as a function of the strength of the
arguments in the text. The mental representation of text
content was assessed with a sentence recognition task and
a short answer task.

Method
Subjects. One hundred twenty eight subjects from a large
Midwestern University in the United States participated in
exchange for partial credit in an Introductory Psychology
course. Subjects were selected from a pool of 548 who
qualified based on their responses to an on-line prescreening test at the beginning of the semester (described below).
Seventy two subjects believed that spanking was an effective means of discipline, whereas 56 believed that it was
ineffective. The mean age of the subjects was 19.03 (standard deviation [SD] = 2.62) and 69% were female. The
racial makeup of the subjects was 57% Caucasian, 6%
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African American, 3% Asian American, 3% Hispanic and
31% other/did not respond.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the Pro and Con texts.

Materials. Two texts were created that present one-sided
arguments regarding the scientific literature related to the
effects of spanking as a means of discipline (see the online
Supplemental Material for the texts). In the “Pro” text, evidence is presented suggesting that spanking is an effective
means of discipline. One section of the Pro text discusses
methodological flaws in the studies that suggest spanking
is harmful. Other sections discuss data suggesting that the
appropriate application of spanking results in increased
child compliance, and the negative effects of Sweden’s
national ban on spanking. In the “Con” text, one section
discusses short-term effects of spanking, indicating that
the data on short-term effectiveness are mixed and inconclusive. Another section discusses negative long-term outcomes associated with spanking, and outlines the criticisms
of this research. The Con text also discusses Sweden’s
spanking ban, suggesting that claims of increased adolescent violence following the ban are misleading and incorrect. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics.
Prior knowledge of the scientific study of spanking was
assessed with a 10-question multiple choice test. A short
answer questionnaire with 10 questions was created for
each text. Some of the questions could be answered with
information directly in the texts, whereas other questions
required inferences. One point was awarded for each correct response, and some questions have an open-ended
number of possible responses, so the number of possible
points on the short answer questionnaires was open ended.
Thirty sentences from each text (Pro and Con) were
selected for the sentence recognition task based on the
results of an earlier rating study. In the rating study, each
subject rated sentences for either the Pro or Con text, and
provided either support or refute ratings with respect to the
proposition that spanking is effective. Ten subjects were in
each of the four conditions. Support was defined as “to
prove correct by evidence or argument”, while refute was
defined as “to prove wrong by evidence or argument.”
Each sentence appeared individually on the computer
screen along with a 1-9 rating scale. In both cases, higher
ratings corresponded to stronger support/refute. Subjects
proceeded through the sentences of the assigned text at
their own pace. The support or refute rating for a sentence
is defined as the mean rating across the 10 subjects. To
select sentences for the sentence recognition task, the 10
sentences that received the highest support ratings and the
10 with the highest refute ratings from each text were used.
Ten sentences were also selected that had neutral scores on
both support and refute ratings. Thus, a total of 30 sentences from the Pro and 30 from the Con text were selected
(10 each of supporting, refuting and neutral from each
text). Half the sentences were old and half new regardless
of which text a subject read. Among the 60 total sentences,

Paragraphs
Words
Flesch-Kincaid grade level
Sentence recognition ratings
Support
Neutral
Refute

Pro text

Con text

18
1870
11.5

16
1942
12.2

8.21 (0.30)
5.06 (0.06)
7.77 (.059)

6.63 (0.74)
4.38 (0.12)
8.45 (0.29)

Sentence recognition ratings are the mean (SD) ratings for the 10
sentences of each type that were used in the sentence recognition task.
Ratings are on a 1-9 scale with large numbers indicating the sentences
were rated as supporting/refuting the proposition that spanking is
effective.

20 sentences were supportive of the proposition, 20 refuted
it and 20 were neutral. See Table 1 for the mean support
and refute ratings, and the online Supplemental Material
for the sentences used.
Procedure. Subjects’ reported their initial spanking beliefs
as part of a prescreening survey they completed within the
first 2 weeks of the semester. The online survey was selfpaced, and contained unrelated questions pertaining to
other experiments. Subjects reported their belief in the
proposition that spanking is an effective way to discipline
a child on a nine-point scale (1 = “completely disbelieve”,
5 = “unsure whether I believe this” and 9 = “completely
believe.”) Subjects who responded 1-3 on the belief scale
were classified as “disbelievers” and subjects who
responded 7-9 were classified as “believers.” Subjects then
completed a belief basis scale (Griffin, 2008) which measures subjects’ reasons for holding beliefs. Belief basis did
not consistently predict any measures of interest, and
therefore is not discussed further. Subjects also responded
to questions about their level of knowledge regarding the
scientific study of spanking, how important the issue was
to them personally and how much they cared about the
issue. Believers and disbelievers were invited by email to
participate in the experiment.
The experiment took place 7-11 weeks after the prescreening. All parts of the experiment were run at computer terminals, with up to four subjects per session.
Subjects began by completing the multiple choice, ‘scientific knowledge of spanking’ test. Both spanking texts
(Pro and Con) defined spanking as “striking a child’s buttocks when he or she misbehaves.” Reading instructions
stated that subjects would read a text presenting evidence
on one side of the issue. Within believers and disbelievers, subjects were randomly assigned to read either the
Pro or Con text. Thus, half the subjects read a belief consistent text and half read a belief inconsistent text.
Subjects read the texts one sentence at a time in a moving
window format. For each paragraph, all sentences except
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Results address the questions that arise from the hypotheses stated earlier. Namely, when subjects experience belief
change after reading a belief inconsistent scientific text, do
they show poor recollection of their initial beliefs?
Moreover, is the relationship between the belief consistency of the text read and belief recollection accuracy
mediated by belief change? Finally, we examine whether
belief recollection accuracy is related to processing or
mental representation of the text.

whether they were believers or disbelievers, belief ratings
for believers were reverse scored to align with disbelievers. As a result, this measure indicates more extreme
beliefs at lower values and more moderate beliefs at higher
values. The analysis showed that initial beliefs (M = 2.15,
SD = 0.87) were more extreme than post-reading beliefs,
M = 3.26, SD = 1.87; F(1, 124) = 63.99, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .34.
While there were no main effects of belief status or text
position (p-values > 0.22), text position interacted with initial vs post-reading belief ratings, F(1, 124) = 4.07,
p = 0.046, ηp2 = .03, as did belief status, F(1, 124) = 4.90,
p = 0.029, ηp2 = .04. These effects were qualified by a belief
rating x belief status x text position interaction, F(1,
124) = 25.58, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .17. This three-way interaction shows that belief change occurred more when subjects
read a belief inconsistent versus a belief consistent text.
Based on the results of this analysis, we collapsed the
belief status and text position variables into a single
dichotomous variable that represented the consistency
between subjects’ initial beliefs and the position of the text
they read. A text belief consistency (consistent vs inconsistent) x belief rating (initial vs post-reading) mixed
effects ANOVA replicated the results of our initial analysis, revealing a main effect of consistency, F(1, 126) = 19.83,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = .14, and belief rating, F(1, 126) = 57.88,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = .32, (see Figure 1). These effects were qualified by the predicted two-way interaction, F(1,
126) = 22.56, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .15. A simple effect test
among subjects who read a belief consistent text revealed
that initial (M = 2.06, SD = 0.82) and post-reading (M = 2.48,
SD = 1.28) belief ratings differed, F(1, 126) = 4.02,
p = 0.047, ηp2 = .03. Initial (M = 2.23, SD = 0.92) and postreading (M = 4.02, SD = 2.04) belief ratings were also different for subjects who read a belief inconsistent text, F(1,
126) = 77.57, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .38. Simple effects between
consistency conditions for initial belief ratings revealed no
significant difference (p = 0.279); however, there was a
significant difference between post-reading belief ratings
for subjects whose text was belief consistent (M = 2.48,
SD = 1.28) versus inconsistent, M = 4.02, SD = 2.04; F(1,
126) = 25.90, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .17.

Initial beliefs, text position and belief change. We examined
initial and post-reading beliefs to establish that the texts
elicited more belief change when they were belief inconsistent versus belief consistent. It was important to establish that belief change occurred among at least some of our
subjects, and we sought to reduce the belief status and text
position variables into two conditions that represented
whether subjects read a belief consistent or inconsistent
text. With this goal in mind, we conducted a mixed measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with initial belief
(believer vs disbeliever) and text position (pro vs con) as
predictors of belief ratings (initial vs post-reading). To
capture the belief strength of subjects, independent of

Recollection accuracy. Recollection of initial beliefs are also
shown in Figure 1. To assess if there were systematic differences in recollection accuracy as a function of text
belief consistency, a mixed-effects ANOVA was conducted
with initial beliefs and recollection of initial beliefs as the
within subject variable, and text belief consistency as the
between subject variable. Consistent with our hypothesis,
this analysis revealed that recollections of initial beliefs
were more moderate (M = 3.04, SD = 1.72) than initial
beliefs, M = 2.15, SD = .87; F(1, 126) = 43.66, p = 0.001,
ηp2 = .26. There was also a main effect of belief consistency, F(1, 126) = 11.36, p = 0.001, ηp2 = .08 that was qualified by the predicted consistency x belief recollection

the sentence being read were obscured by dashes.
Subjects were instructed to read each sentence until they
understood it, then press the spacebar. At that point, the
current sentence turned back into dashes and the next
sentence turned from dashes to text. At the end of the
text, subjects took a 5-min break.
Subjects then completed the sentence recognition task.
All 60 sentences were presented one at a time, randomized
for each subject. Instructions stated that subjects should
decide if each sentence was presented word-for-word in
the text they read. If so, they pressed a button labeled
“old”, and if not, they pressed the “new” button. Following
the recognition test, subjects completed the short answer
test. Subjects were instructed to answer the questions in
order and to type their answers directly into Microsoft
Word. Next, subjects answered the post-reading belief
questions. Subjects first reported their belief about whether
spanking is an effective means of discipline (referred to as
“post-reading belief”). This question was identical to the
prescreening belief question and was presented by itself on
an otherwise blank sheet of paper. After subjects responded,
the experimenter collected the question and gave subjects
another sheet of paper with the prescreening belief recollection question. On the same scale that was used previously, subjects were instructed to recall their response to
this question at the beginning of the semester by circling
the number that was “the same as your answer at the beginning of the semester.” Finally, subjects were debriefed and
dismissed.

Results
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Figure 1. Initial and post-reading belief ratings, and
recollection of initial belief ratings as a function of the
consistency between belief status of the subject (believer/
disbeliever) and position of the text read (pro/con) for
Experiment 1. Error bars are SEMs.

interaction, F(1, 126) = 12.39, p = 0.001, ηp2 = .09. For subjects who read a belief consistent text, initial belief ratings
(M = 2.06, SD = 0.82) were more extreme than recollections of those beliefs, M = 2.48, SD = 1.27; F(1, 126) = 4.69,
p = 0.032, ηp2 = .04. Among subjects who read a belief
inconsistent text, initial belief ratings (M = 2.23, SD = 0.92)
were also more extreme than recollections of those beliefs,
M = 3.58, SD = 1.93, F(1, 126) = 77.57, p = 0.001, ηp2 = .38.
While there was no difference between text conditions
among participants’ initial belief ratings (p = 0.286), recollections of initial beliefs were more moderate for subjects
who read a belief inconsistent text (M = 3.58, SD = 1.93)
than a belief consistent text, M = 2.48, SD = 1.27; F(1,
126) = 14.67, p = 0.001, ηp2 = .10.
Sentence reading times. Sentence reading times were analyzed as a function of belief status and text position, and
were correlated with measures of belief change and recollection accuracy. Belief change and recollection accuracy
were calculated by subtracting subjects’ post-reading
belief rating (or initial belief recollection) from their initial
belief ratings. To analyze sentence reading times, the support and refute ratings for each text sentence from the rating study were used. Support and refute ratings across
sentences were highly correlated for both the Pro,
r(118) = –0.93, p < 0.001, and Con text, r(120) = –0.91,
p < 0.001. Since these ratings were not empirically distinct,
only support ratings were used in sentence reading time
analyses. Consistent with Lorch and Myers (1990), sentence reading times for each subject were regressed on six
traditional predictors of reading times in addition to support ratings for each sentence.1 Higher beta weights for the
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support ratings from these regressions indicate a reading
slow down for sentences that are more supportive of the
proposition after controlling for the six traditional predictors. Lower beta weights indicate a reading speed up for
sentences that are more supportive of the proposition after
controlling for the six traditional predictors. These beta
weights were analyzed with a between subjects ANOVA in
which initial belief and text position were between subjects variables. Subjects who read the Pro text slowed
down reading as a function of the supportiveness of sentences (M = 35.99, SD = 202.04) relative to subjects who
read the Con text, M = –90.00, SD = 202.04; F(1,
126) = 12.64, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .09. There was no significant
difference in support beta weights as a function of belief
status (M = –40.79, SD = 200.87 for disbelievers and
M = –13.23, SD = 200.87 for believers, F(1, 126) = 0.60,
p = 0.44, and the belief status x text position interaction
was not significant, F(1, 126) = 0.79, p = 0.376. Correlations between support beta weights and belief change
(r = 0.09) and recollection accuracy (r = 0.02) were both
non-significant.
Sentence recognition and short answer questions. For the
sentence recognition test, each subject responded to 30
“old” sentences which were taken from the text they read
and 30 “new” sentences that were taken from the text they
did not read. In signal detection terms, “old” responses to
previously read sentences are hits and “old” responses to
new sentences are false alarms. Hit rate (HR) and false
alarm rate (FAR) were combined to create a measure of
accuracy in discriminating old from new sentences called
d’ (Swets, 1986), which is calculated from the formula d′=
Z(HR) – Z(FAR). A d′ of 0 represents chance performance
at discriminating old from new sentences. d′ increases to
the extent subjects are successful at responding “old” to
sentences that were read and “new” to sentences that were
not read. Prior knowledge and topic importance were
uncorrelated with d′ and were therefore not included in
further in analyses. Table 2 shows d′ means and correlations with belief change and recollection accuracy. There
was no significant difference between d′ scores as a function of belief consistency (p = 0.593), and d′ scores did not
significantly correlate with belief change (ps = 0.091 for
belief inconsistent and 0.812 for belief consistent) or recollection accuracy (ps = 0.485 for belief inconsistent and
0.802 for belief consistent).
Subjects’ total score on the short answer test was examined as a function of belief consistency, and scores were
correlated with belief change and recollection accuracy
(see Table 2). There was no significant difference in short
answer performance as a function of belief consistency
(p = 0.989) and no significant correlations with belief
change or recollection accuracy (ps > 0.290). With 10
questions, and an open-ended number of points possible,
performance on the short answer questionnaire was poor.
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Table 2. Means (SD) for comprehension tasks and correlations with belief change and recollection accuracy. Significant
relationships are denoted by * = p < 0.05.
Experiment 1
Belief consistent
Means
d′
1.21 (0.65)
Short answer
5.37 (2.24)
Evidence listing
Correlation w/ belief change
d’
–.03
Short answer
.06
Evidence listing
Correlation w/ recollection accuracy
d′
–.01
Short answer
.03
Evidence listing

Experiment 2
Belief inconsistent

Belief consistent

Belief inconsistent

1.14 (0.66)
5.37 (2.53)

0.88 (0.61)

0.82 (0.54)

3.63 (2.28)

4.32 (2.36)

.21
.14

.09
.07

–.26

.03

–.21

–.08

–.08

.01

–.19

–.19

was most likely to occur for individuals who read belief
inconsistent articles. The ratio of indirect versus direct
effects (B = 158.09, SE(Boot) = 758.47, CI(Boot) = [248.30,
23923.72]) and indirect to total effects (B = .99,
SE(Boot) = .34, CI(Boot) = [0.70, 1.63]) further indicates
that the majority of variance in recollection accuracy that
is explained by the belief consistency of the text is occurring via belief change.
Figure 2. Process model of direct and indirect (via Belief
Change) effects of text consistency on recollection accuracy
for Experiment 1.

Since processing and memory measures did not differ as a
function of the consistency between the subjects’ initial
beliefs and the text position, reading times, sentence recognition and short answer question performance were not
considered as possible mediators of the relationship
between belief consistency of the text and recollection
accuracy.
Mediation analysis. Process modeling (Hayes, 2013) was
used to test whether the relationship between belief consistency of the text read and recollection accuracy was
mediated by belief change (see Figure 2). Model 4 (Hayes,
2013) was used with 1000 bootstrap samples. This model
accounted for a significant amount of the variance, F(2,
125) = 22.56, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.58. Text belief consistency
(0 = consistent; 1 = inconsistent) predicted belief change,
B = 1.37, SE = .28, t(126) = 4.75, p < 0.001, 95% CI = (0.80,
1.94), but showed no direct effect on recollection accuracy after controlling for the indirect effect belief change
(p = 0.976). The indirect effect of text belief consistency
on recollection accuracy via belief change showed significant mediation (B = .94 SE(Boot) = .23, 95% CI = [0.52,
1.43]). The results of this model show that belief change

Discussion
There were two primary findings in Experiment 1. In
accordance with our hypothesis, subjects experienced
belief change after they read texts that were inconsistent
with their initial beliefs. These subjects made large recollection errors when attempting to recall the initial beliefs
they held prior to reading belief inconsistent texts. Belief
recollections were closer to current beliefs than they were
to initial beliefs, which suggests that people have poor
metacognitive awareness of changes in their beliefs. The
results of the process model provides preliminary evidence indicating the mechanism by which exposure to
belief inconsistent information influences recollection
errors. Exposure to belief inconsistent information leads
to belief change, which in turn predicts recollection accuracy. This mediational effect explains the majority of variance in recollection accuracy, while the direct effect of
text belief consistency on recollection accuracy in the
mediation model was not significant. We found no evidence to support the idea that processing or mental representation of the text content is related to awareness of
belief change. Sentence reading time measures of argument-focused processing (Wolfe et al., 2013) showed no
relationship with recollection accuracy. Sentence recognition accuracy and short answer question performance
were unrelated to recollection accuracy and belief change.
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Experiment 2
Experiment 2 represents an attempt to replicate and extend
the results of Experiment 1. One shortcoming of
Experiment 1 was that performance on the short answer
questions was relatively poor, and may not have varied
enough to capture the potential differences in comprehension. In order to address this possibility, we incorporated
an evidence listing task in Experiment 2. In this task, subjects listed as many evidence statements as possible, both
supporting and refuting the proposition that spanking is
effective. The sentence-by-sentence reading time procedure was replaced by a more ecologically valid reading
procedure. Subjects read a hard copy of their assigned text,
and were instructed to use whatever comprehension methods they typically use in studying for an exam.

Methods
Subjects. One hundred seventeen subjects from a large
Midwestern United States University participated in
exchange for partial credit in an Introductory Psychology
course. Subjects were selected from a pool of 491 and
solicited using the same procedure as in Experiment 1.
Seventy two believed spanking was an effective means of
discipline, whereas 45 did not. The mean age of the subjects was 18.85 (SD = 1.78) and 76% were female. Subjects were 64% Caucasian, 2% African American, 1%
Asian American, 3% Hispanic and 30% other/did report
their race.
Materials. Materials were identical to Experiment 1 with
the exception that the short answer questions were replaced
by the evidence listing task.
Procedure. The prescreening procedure was the same as
Experiment 1 and the experiment took place six to 10
weeks after the prescreening. As in Experiment 1, participants completed the prior knowledge procedure. Subjects
read a hard copy of either the Pro or Con text, which was
randomly assigned within spanking belief categories.
Reading instructions were the same as Experiment 1
except for the moving window instructions. Subjects were
also instructed that they could take notes or underline parts
of the text if they wished. After reading, subjects completed two evidence listing tasks, one for supporting evidence and one for refuting evidence (counterbalanced for
order). For each task, subjects received a sheet of paper
with instructions to list as much supporting (refuting) evidence from the text as they could. Instructions stated that
“The evidence you list could be either data that were presented, or arguments addressing spanking effectiveness
that were supported by reasons.” A prompt stated “Spanking is an effective (ineffective) means of discipline because
_____.”After listing as much supporting or refuting evidence as they could, subjects were given the second sheet
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of paper and listed evidence for the opposite side of the
topic. Next, subjects completed the sentence recognition
task, post-reading belief rating and initial belief recollection questions.

Results
Results are organized in a manner similar to Experiment 1
and address the same questions. Namely, do subjects show
poor recollection accuracy for initial beliefs following
belief change, and if so, is the relationship between belief
consistency of the text and recollection accuracy mediated
by belief change? Moreover, do belief change and recollection accuracy relate to performance on the sentence recognition and evidence listing tasks?
Initial beliefs, text position and belief change. As in Experiment 1, an absolute measure of belief strength among subjects was calculated by reverse scoring belief ratings for
believers in spanking as an effective form of discipline.
Lower ratings indicate more extreme beliefs, whereas
higher ratings indicate more moderate beliefs. See Figure
3 for means.
We again examined beliefs as a function of belief status
and text position to ensure that belief change was greater
for subjects who read a belief inconsistent text compared to
a belief consistent text. A mixed-effects ANOVA was conducted with belief status (believer vs disbeliever) and text
position (pro vs con) as between subjects variables, and
belief rating (initial vs post-reading) as a within subjects
variable. This analysis showed that initial belief ratings
(M = 2.26, SD = 0.80) were more extreme than post-reading
ratings, M = 3.30, SD = 1.70; F(1, 113) = 61.06, p < 0.001,
ηp2 = .35. There were no main effects of belief status or text
position (ps > 0.362) and text position did not interact with
belief status (p > 0.517). However, belief status did interact
with initial vs post-reading ratings, F(1, 113) = 16.96,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = .13. This effect was qualified by the predicted text position x belief status x initial vs post-reading
rating interaction, F(1, 113) = 24.06, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .18.
This analysis indicates that belief inconsistent texts elicited
greater belief change than belief consistent texts.
As in Experiment 1, subjects were categorized as having read either a belief consistent or belief inconsistent
spanking text (see Figure 3). A consistency (consistent vs
inconsistent) x belief rating (initial vs post-reading) mixedeffects ANOVA revealed a main effect of consistency, F(1,
115) = 10.38, p = 0.002, ηp2 = .08, and belief rating, F(1,
115) = 43.83, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .28. These effects were qualified by the predicted two-way interaction, F(1, 115) = 20.97,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = .15. A simple effect test among subjects
who read a belief consistent text revealed that initial and
post-reading belief ratings did not differ (p = 0.157).
However, initial (M = 2.18, SD = 0.81) and post-reading
(M = 3.92, SD = 1.80) beliefs did differ among subjects
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Finally, recollections of initial beliefs were more moderate for subjects who read a belief inconsistent (M = 3.48,
SD = 1.73) compared to a belief consistent text, M = 2.75,
SD = 1.31; F(1, 115) = 6.53, p = 0.012, ηp2 = .05.

Figure 3. Initial and post-reading belief ratings, and
recollection of initial belief ratings as a function of the
consistency between belief status of the subject (believer/
disbeliever) and position of the text read (pro/con) for
Experiment 2. Error bars are SEMs.

who read a belief inconsistent text, F(1, 115) = 64.37,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = .36. Simple effects between consistency
conditions for initial belief ratings revealed no significant
difference (p = 0.313); however, there was a significant difference between post-reading belief ratings for subjects
whose text was belief consistent (M = 2.65, SD = 1.33) versus inconsistent, M = 3.92, SD = 1.80; F(1, 115) = 18.65,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = .14; see Figure 3.
Recollection accuracy. Recollections of initial beliefs
are shown in Figure 3. To assess if text belief consistency
affected recollection accuracy, we conducted a mixed
effects ANOVA. Initial beliefs and recollection of initial beliefs were analyzed as a within subjects variable,
and belief consistency was a between subjects variable.
Replicating the results of Experiment 1, there was a main
effect of belief rating such that recollections of initial
beliefs were more moderate (M = 3.30, SD = 1.70) than
actual initial beliefs, M = 2.26, SD = .80; F(1, 115) = 43.83,
p = 0.001, ηp2 = .28. There was a main effect of belief consistency, F(1, 115) = 10.38, p = 0.002, ηp2 = .08, which
was qualified by a belief consistency x recollection interaction, F(1, 115) = 11.29, p = 0.003, ηp2 = .08. A simple
effect test for subjects who read a belief consistent text
revealed that initial belief ratings (M = 2.33, SD = 0.79)
were more extreme than recollection of those beliefs,
M = 2.75, SD = 1.31; F(1, 115) = 4.26, p = 0.041, ηp2 = .03.
Among subjects who read the belief inconsistent text,
initial belief ratings (M = 2.18, SD = 0.81) were more
extreme than recollections of those beliefs, M = 3.48,
SD = 1.73; F(1, 115) = 42.79, p < 0.001, ηp2 = .27. There
were no significant differences in initial belief ratings as a function of text belief consistency (p = 0.313).

Sentence recognition and evidence listing. Sentence recognition was analyzed in the same manner as Experiment
1 (see Table 2). There again was no significant difference
in discrimination accuracy (d′) for subjects who read a
belief consistent text compared to a belief inconsistent text
(p = 0.537). Evidence listing data were scored by matching listing statements to arguments and evidence in the
text. For each text, a list of both supporting and refuting
arguments and evidence were created. Subjects’ lists of
supporting arguments and evidence were matched to the
supporting list, and refuting arguments and evidence were
matched to the refuting list. Statements that were listed but
not in the text were not analyzed. Two raters scored a set
of 20 subjects (Kappa = .74), then one rater scored the rest
of the subjects. The total number of arguments listed for
each subject was analyzed as a function of belief consistency (see Table 2), and were not significantly different,
(p = 0.112). Correlations between d′ and evidence listing
data with belief change and recollection accuracy are
also presented in Table 2. There were no significant correlations among any of these measures (ps > 0.145). As a
result, these comprehension measures were not considered
as possible mediators in the relationship between belief
consistency and recollection accuracy.
Mediation analysis. As in Experiment 1, process modeling (Hayes, 2013) was used to examine whether the
relationship between belief consistency of the text read
and recollection accuracy was mediated by belief change.
Belief change and recollection accuracy were calculated
in the same way as Experiment 1. Model 4 (Hayes, 2013)
was used with 1000 bootstrap samples. This model
accounted for a significant amount of the variance, F(2,
114) = 53.86, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.49. Text belief consistency (0 = consistent; 1 = inconsistent) predicted belief
change, B = 1.42, SE = .31, t(115) = 4.58, p < 0.001, 95%
CI = (0.80, 2.03). The indirect effect of text belief consistency on recollection accuracy via belief change showed
significant mediation (B = .87, SE(Boot) = .23, 95%
CI(Boot) = [0.48, 1.42], see Figure 4), but there was no
direct effect on recollection accuracy after controlling for
the indirect effect of belief change (p = 0.962). The results
of this model show that belief change was most likely
to occur for individuals who read a belief inconsistent
text. The ratio of indirect versus direct effects (B = 80.00,
SE(Boot) = 1277.01,
CI(Boot) = [90.19,
40255.63],
and indirect to total effects, B = .99, SE(Boot) = 1.82,
CI(Boot) = (0.59, 1.97) further indicates that the majority of variance in recollection accuracy that is explained
by text belief consistency is occurring via belief change.
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Figure 4. Process model of direct and indirect (via Belief
Change) effects of text consistency on recollection accuracy
for Experiment 2.

Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 show the same pattern of
effects for belief change and recollection accuracy that
were observed in Experiment 1. Subjects changed their
beliefs in the direction of the text position, and recollection
of their initial beliefs were more similar to post-reading
beliefs than to initial beliefs. In particular, the relationship
between the belief consistency of the text read and recollection accuracy was strongly mediated by belief change.
Measures of recognition memory, as well as evidence and
argument listing on both sides of the topic, did not predict
either belief change or recollection accuracy.

General discussion
Across two experiments, people showed evidence of poor
metacognitive awareness of belief change about a social
science topic. Following belief change, recollections of
initial beliefs were generally inaccurate and biased toward
current beliefs. In mediation analyses in both experiments,
results showed that the relationship between the belief
consistency of the text read by a person and their accuracy
at recollecting their initial belief was mediated by their
level of belief change. These results suggest that recollections of previous beliefs are constructive, and influenced
by the beliefs of the person at the time of the recollection.
We propose that changes in beliefs do not tend to be monitored as they happen. Rather, we propose that people simply use salient information at the moment of recollection
to try to reconstruct their previous beliefs.
The nature of these metacognitive errors mirror those
found in attitude studies (Bem & McConnell, 1970;
Goethals & Reckman, 1973; Levine, 1997; Levine &
Safer, 2002; Markus, 1986). However, this is the first study
to demonstrate poor metacognitive awareness of belief
change. In both experiments, measures of processing
(Experiment 1) and mental representation (Experiments 1
and 2) failed to predict the accuracy of belief recollections.
Thus, the current studies failed to provide evidence for the
idea that subjects who comprehend a text at a higher level
are more aware of changes in their beliefs.
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The fluency hypothesis from metacognitive monitoring research (Dunlosky & Thiede, 2013) provides a potential explanation for this metacognitive error. While people
have beliefs about spanking effectiveness, they likely
have little knowledge of the scientific research on this
topic. Consequently, the beliefs reported in the prescreening may have been constructed from a memory representation that included general feelings about the topic or
personal experiences. After reading, people’s memory
representation was likely dominated by the text content
and the beliefs that arose from their interpretation of the
content (Kintsch, 1998). According to the fluency hypothesis, these beliefs then would have influenced the recollection of subjects’ initial beliefs. Two patterns in the
observed results substantiate this interpretation. First,
belief change was a strong mediator of the relationship
between text belief consistency and recollection accuracy.
This result suggests that the interpretation of the text content is salient at the time of recollection and influences
recollection processes.2 The mediation analyses also indicate that the direct effect of text belief consistency on recollection accuracy was not significant. Thus, there is no
evidence to indicate that the text affects recollection accuracy independent of its influence on beliefs. Second, in
both experiments, none of the measures of processing or
mental representation predicted belief change or recollection accuracy. While caution must be used when interpreting null findings, none of the measures from the current
experiments indicate that understanding of text content is
related to the recollection process.
Comprehension monitoring research suggests that
when available cues provide a valid assessment of the
mental representation, then judgments of comprehension
are relatively accurate (Thiede, Anderson, & Therriault,
2003; Thiede et al., 2010; Wiley et al., 2005). These cues
tend to be more accurate when they require subjects to
make judgments about their understanding of the general
meaning of a text rather than their superficial memory or
sense of familiarity with the topic. However, recollection
of previous beliefs is likely a more difficult task than judgments of comprehension. First, accurate metacognitive
awareness of belief change requires a person to be aware
not only of their current beliefs, but to accurately reconstruct a mental representation from a previous time. People
may have little to no familiarity with this type of judgment,
and metacognition experiments tend to require subjects to
assess either their present comprehension, or performance
in the future (e.g., Tauber & Rhodes, 2012). Second, in
recollecting a previous belief, there is no particular text
memory or learning experience to try to recollect. Beliefs
may have been relatively ill-formed, and may have even
been generated at the time they were initially reported.
Thus, it may be that when people attempt to recollect previous beliefs, at least under some circumstances, they are
attempting to recollect a memory representation that was
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weak to begin with. The potential discrepancy in memory
strength between initial beliefs and beliefs generated after
reading is consistent with our claim that current beliefs are
more salient at the time of recollection of initial beliefs.
Schwarz (2007) makes a similar argument about attitudes,
suggesting that they are contextually constructed at the
time a person reports them rather than stable, stored properties of long-term memory.
Another potential interpretation of these results is that
they arise from beliefs about belief change (Mueller et al.,
2016; Ross, 1989). In particular, subjects may be acting
according to Ross’ (1989) implicit theory of stability.
According to this theory, people may assume that their
beliefs about spanking effectiveness are stable. If so, the
task of recollecting previous beliefs is one in which current
beliefs are assessed and an assumption is made that previous beliefs must be similar. After belief change, people
may assume that their current beliefs must be the same or
similar as their previous beliefs. Fluency and beliefs about
belief change are not mutually exclusive explanations for
the results presented here, and so further exploration of the
mechanisms underlying metacognitive awareness of belief
change will be needed.
The current claim that people have poor metacognitive
awareness of belief changes is also consistent with experiments in the attitude literature in which perceived attitude
change fails to correspond with attitude change when it is
assessed using pre and post measures (Corner et al., 2012;
Miller et al., 1993; Munro & Ditto, 1997). These experiments were designed to address the phenomenon of attitude polarization (Lord et al., 1979), in which subjects
read arguments on both sides of a controversial issue and
reported more polarized attitudes than before reading.
Evidence in support of attitude polarization is most commonly found when the dependent variable is perceived
attitude change. However, when attitude change is measured by differences between pre and post ratings, the
results do not tend to support attitude polarization. As we
have argued, perceived change is a metacognitive measure, and is dependent on an accurate recollection of previous attitudes in order to be valid. Thus, it is possible that
some attitude polarization findings may actually reflect
poor metacognitive awareness of attitude change.

Relationships between comprehension, belief
change and awareness of belief change
In this research, we also examined the memory representation that people formed as a result of comprehending information in a one-sided scientific text. No evidence was
found to suggest that people differed in comprehension
success as a function of whether they believed or did not
believe the information they read. This finding is consistent with other research in which no belief-related differences in comprehension success were found (Bohn-Gettler

& McCrudden, 2017; Wolfe et al., 2013). While some
researchers have found evidence that people put more processing effort into belief inconsistent information (Edwards
& Smith, 1996), the processing data from Experiment 1
contradicts this idea. Moreover, there was no evidence to
indicate the existence of a relationship between comprehension success and either belief change or recollection
accuracy. It is therefore left to future research to explore
whether comprehension processes may relate to metacognitive awareness of belief change.

Conclusion
These experiments are the first to indicate that when people change their beliefs, they show biased memory for
their previous beliefs. These results also suggest that people are unaware of these changes, which are primarily
influenced by their beliefs at the moment they make this
metacognitive judgment. An area where this bias is likely
to emerge is in the domain of science text comprehension.
Science educators, and authors who write about science
for the general public, encourage people to change their
beliefs to match the preponderance of evidence on a topic.
However, the current evidence suggests that people may
be less willing to meaningfully consider belief inconsistent
material if they feel that their beliefs are unlikely to change
as a consequence. Moreover, people who do meaningfully
engage with such material may be unaware of the extent to
which their beliefs are shaped by evidence they read. The
present research indicates that an important component of
overall science literacy may be to develop a more refined
understanding of the extent to which evidence can potentially change people’s beliefs. As such, the practical consequences of this type of metacognitive error will be
important to examine in future research.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this
article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship and/or publication of this article.

Notes
1.

Each sentence was scored on six dimensions established
in previous research to be significant predictors of reading times in expository text comprehension. The number of
syllables per sentence was included to capture word level
processing (Zwaan et al., 1995). The number of new noun
concepts per sentence (new argument nouns) and a binary
code indicating whether a sentence shares a noun concept with the previous sentence (argument overlap) were
included to capture sentence level processing (Graesser,
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2.
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Hoffman, & Clark, 1980; Zwaan et al., 1995). Situation
level variables included were binary codes indicating topic
and summary sentences, and the serial position of a sentence
within each section of a text (Britton, 1994).
One limitation of the fluency hypothesis in the current
research is that in both experiments, current beliefs were
reported before recollection of previous beliefs. In subsequent research (Wolfe, Williams, Geers, Hessler, & Simon,
2014), we manipulated the order in which subjects report
current beliefs vs recollecting previous beliefs. This order
manipulation had no influence on either current beliefs or
recollections.
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